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Abstract
We study the fair division of a collection of m indivisible goods amongst a set of n agents.
Whilst envy-free allocations typically do not exist in the indivisible goods setting, envy-freeness
can be achieved if some amount of a divisible good (money) is introduced. Specifically, Halpern
and Shah [11] showed that, given additive valuation functions where the marginal value of each
item is at most one dollar for each agent, there always exists an envy-free allocation requiring a
subsidy of at most (n−1)·m dollars. The authors also conjectured that a subsidy of n−1 dollars
is sufficient for additive valuations. We prove this conjecture. In fact, a subsidy of at most one
dollar per agent is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-free allocation. Further, we
prove that for general monotonic valuation functions an envy-free allocation always exists with
a subsidy of at most 2(n − 1) dollars per agent. In particular, the total subsidy required for
monotonic valuations is independent of the number of items.
1 Introduction
We consider the fair division of m indivisible items amongst n agents. Specifically, we desire an
allocation where no agent is envious of any other; that is, the value each agent has for its own
allocated bundle is at least as great as its value for the bundle of any other agent. This concept,
called envy-freeness, was introduced by Foley [8]. For divisible goods, Varian [20] explained how to
obtain envy-free allocations using the theory of general equilibria: simply share each good equally
amongst the agents and then find a competitive equilibrium. Thus envy-free allocations exist for
classes of valuation functions where competitive equilibria are guaranteed to exist.
Unfortunately for indivisible goods it is easy to see that envy-free allocations do not exist
in general. For example, if the number of agents exceeds the number of items, then in every
allocation there is an agent who receives an empty bundle. In classical work, Maskin [15] asked if
this impossibility result could be circumvented by the addition of a single divisible good, namely
money. If so, how much money is needed to eradicate all envy? He considered the case of a
market with n agents and m = n goods where each agent can be allocated at most one good, and
has, without loss of generality, a value of at most one dollar for any specific good. Maskin [15]
then showed that an envy-free allocation exists with the addition of n− 1 dollars into the market.
But what happens in the general setting where the number of agents and number of goods may
differ and where agents may be allocated more than one good? The purpose of this paper is to
understand this case of multi-unit demand valuations. In this setting, Halpern and Shah [11] proved
that m · (n − 1) dollars suffice to support an envy-free allocation when the agents have additive
valuation functions. Further, they conjectured that, as with the unit-demand setting, there always
exists an allocation for which n− 1 dollars suffice.
The main result in this paper is the verification of this conjecture: for additive valuation
functions, precisely n− 1 dollars is sufficient to guarantee the existence of an envy-free allocation.
In fact, our result is stronger in several ways. First, not only is the subsidy at most n− 1 dollars in
total but each agent receives at most one dollar in subsidy. Secondly, this allocation is also envy-free
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up to one good (EF1) – this settles a second conjecture from [11]. Thirdly, the allocation is balanced,
that is, the cardinalities of the allocated bundles differ by at most one good. Furthermore, this
envy-free allocation can be constructed in polynomial time.
We also study the case of general valuation functions. Requiring only the very mild assumption
that the valuation functions are monotone, we prove the perhaps surprising result that envy-
free solutions still exist with a subsidy amount that is independent of the number of goods m.
Specifically, we prove that there is an envy-free allocation where each agent receives a subsidy of
at most 2(n − 1) dollars, which is a total subsidy of O(n2). Here the envy-free allocation can be
constructed in polynomial time given a valuation oracle.
1.1 Related Work
Fair division has been extensively studied over the past six decades. The concept of a fair allocation
was formally introduced by Steinhaus [16] via the cake-cutting problem: how can a heterogeneous
cake be fairly divided among a set of agents? To address this question, it is necessary to first define
fairness. The fairness objective of Steinhaus [16] was proportionality. An allocation is proportional
if every agent is allocated a bundle (or piece of cake) of value at least 1
n
of its total value for the
grand bundle (entire cake). For cake-cutting, and divisible goods in general, when the valuations
are additive, envy-freeness implies proportionality. This is because, for any agent and any partition
of the cake into n pieces, some piece must be worth at least 1
n
of the whole cake to that agent.
Thus envy-freeness is a stronger fairness guarantee than proportionality. Another classical fairness
measure is equitability, where all agents should receive bundles of the same value. In the case of
divisible goods, Alon [2] showed for additive continuous valuation functions that allocations exist
that satisfy proportionality, equitability and envy-freeness simultaneously. Algorithmic methods to
obtain envy-free cake divisions for any number of agents are also known; see, for example, Brams
and Taylor [5].
More recently, Budish [6] introduced the maximin share guarantee inspired by the cut-and-
choose protocol. Assume an agent partitions the items into n bundles and then receives the lowest-
value bundle. The corresponding value that the agent obtains by selecting its optimal partition is
called its maximin share. The fairness objective then is to find an allocation where every agent
receives a bundle of value at least its maximin share.
Unfortunately, for indivisible goods, there are examples where proportionality, envy-freeness,
equitability and the maximin share guarantee are all impossible to achieve. Consequently, there
has been much focus on approximate fairness guarantees. One natural approach is the design of
approximation algorithms for the maximin share problem. An alternative guarantee is via EF-k
allocations [6], where an agent has no envy provided k goods are removed from the bundles of the
other agents. Of special interest are the envy bounded by a single good, or EF1 allocations. Lipton
et al. [14] showed that, when the valuation functions are monotone, an EF1 allocation exists and
it can be computed in polynomial time. A large body of recent work on the fair allocation of
indivisible goods has focused on achieving these types of approximation guarantee [9, 13, 4, 7].
A parallel line of research considers the use of money in the fair allocation of indivisible goods.
This is motivated by the rent division problem, where the goal is to allocate n indivisible goods
among n agents and divide a fixed total cost, i.e. the rent, amongst the agents. Su [17] showed that,
under mild assumptions, rental harmony can be achieved: there is an envy-free division of the goods
and the rent. The majority of the literature in this area considers the setting with n unit-demand
agents, m = n indivisible items and one divisible good, akin to money. Svensson [18] showed
that an envy-free and pareto efficient allocation exists under certain conditions. Tadenuma and
Thomson [19] study the structure of envy-free allocations of a single indivisible good when monetary
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compensations are possible. Maskin [15] studies a similar model to [18] under slightly different
conditions; he showed that, with sufficient money, an envy-free allocation always exists. Specifically,
his results imply that if the agents are unit-demand and their value for each item is at most one
dollar, then a total of n − 1 dollars suffices for envy-freeness. In Aragones [3] and Klijn [12], the
authors consider the same model and give polynomial-time algorithms to compute an envy-free
allocation with subsidy.
Among the papers that consider a setting with more than n items, most reduce to the above
n-item case where at most one good is allocated to each agent. For example, Alkan et al. [1]
consider the more general m-item setting and allow the possibility of undesirable objects, but their
procedure introduces either “null objects” or “fictitious people” to equalize the number of agents
and items before outputting an allocation with single-item bundles. Haake et al. [10] also consider
the m-good case and provide a procedure to compute an envy-free allocation with side-payments,
but their approach begins by bundling the goods into n sets.
In recent work, Halpern and Shah [11] extend the above models to the multi-demand setting
with any numberm of indivisible goods. Specifically, they consider the setting in which the n agents
have additive valuation functions over a set of m items, and, without loss of generality, the value
of each item is at most 1. They characterize the envy-freeable allocations in terms of the structure
of the envy graph (see Section 2.1), whose nodes are the agents and whose arc weights represent
the envies between pairs of agents. They then study the problem of minimizing the amount of
subsidy that is sufficient to guarantee envy-freeness. It is easy to see this minimum subsidy can be
at least n−1 for all envy-freeable allocations. Indeed, consider the case of a single item which each
agent values at exactly one dollar; evidently, every agent that does not receive the item must be
compensated with a dollar. They present a matching upper bound of n− 1 dollars for the special
cases of binary and identical additive valuations.
More generally, they prove that, for additive valuations, an envy-freeable allocation always
exists if the total subsidy at least is m · (n − 1) dollars. But, based on the experimental analysis
of over 100, 000 synthetic instances and over 3, 000 real-world instances of fair division, Halpern
and Shah [11] conjecture that this upper bound can be improved to n − 1 dollars. That is, for
agents with additive valuations an envy-freeable allocation that requires a subsidy of at most n− 1
always exists. In addition, they conjecture that an allocation exists that is both envy-freeable (with
perhaps a much larger subsidy) and EF1 for the fair division problem with additive valuations.
Conjecture 1.1. [11] For additive valuations, there is an envy-freeable allocation that requires a
total subsidy of at most n− 1 dollars.
Conjecture 1.2. [11] For additive valuations, there is an envy-freeable allocation that is EF1.
1.2 Our Results
In this work we settle both Conjecture 1.1 and Conjecture 1.2. In fact, our main result is even
stronger in a several ways. To wit, we show that, for any instance with additive valuations, there
is an allocation that is simultaneously envy-freeable, EF1, balanced, and requires a total subsidy
of at most n − 1 dollars. Moreover, we present an algorithm that computes such an allocation in
polynomial time. Our bound not only applies to the total subsidy, but to each individual payment
– the payment made to each agent in this allocation is at most one dollar! Formally, in Sections 3
and 4 we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3. For additive valuations there is an envy-freeable allocation where the subsidy to
each agent is at most one dollar. (This allocation is also EF1, balanced, and can be computed in
polynomial time.)
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It is easy to see that, when minimizing the total subsidy, at least one agent will not receive a
subsidy. Thus Theorem 1.3 implies that the total subsidy required is indeed at most n− 1 dollars.
In Section 5 we consider the general setting where the agents have arbitrary monotone valuation
functions. Analogously, without loss of generality, we may scale the valuations so that marginal
value of each item for any agent never exceeds one dollar. We show that there is an envy-freeable
allocation in which the subsidy required is at most 2(n−1) dollars per agent. Thus, the total subsidy
required to ensure the existence of an envy-free allocation at most O(n2). Note that the assumption
of monotonicity is extremely mild and so the valuations the agents have for bundles of items may
range from 0 to Ω(m) in quite an arbitrary manner. Consequently, it is somewhat remarkable that
the total subsidy required to ensure the existence of an envy-free allocation is independent of the
number of items m. In particular, when m is large the subsidy required is negligible in terms of
m and thus, typically, also negligible in terms of the values of the allocated bundles. In this case,
given a valuation oracle for each agents, the corresponding envy-free allocation and subsidies can
be computed in polynomial time. Specifically, in Section 5 we prove:
Theorem 1.4. For monotonic valuations there is an envy-freeable allocation where the subsidy to
each agent is at most 2(n − 1) dollars. (Given a valuation oracle, this allocation can be computed
in polynomial time.)
In effect, our work implies that there is, in fact, a much stronger connection between the classical
divisible goods (cake-cutting) setting and the indivisible goods setting than was previously known.
While the classical guarantees (envy-freeness and proportionality) can be achieved with divisible
goods, for the indivisible-goods setting much of the recent literature focuses on achieving weaker
fairness properties. We show that by simply introducing a small subsidy that only depends on the
number of agents, the much stronger classical guarantees can be achieved in the indivisible goods
setting. Moreover, allocations that give these classical guarantees with a small bounded subsidy
can be efficiently found.
2 The Fair Division with Subsidy Problem
There is a set I = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents and a set J = {1, 2, . . . ,m} of indivisible goods (items).
Each agent i ∈ I has a valuation function vi over the set of items. That is, for each bundle
S ⊆ J of items, agent i has value vi(S). We make the standard assumptions that the valuation
functions are monotonic, that is, vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) when S ⊆ T , and that vi(∅) = 0. An agent i and
valuation function vi are additive if, for each item j ∈ J , agent i has value vi(j) = vi({j}), and
for any collection S ⊆ J , agent i has value vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi(j). We denote the vector of valuation
functions by v = (v1, . . . , vn), and call v a valuation profile. Additionally, without loss of generality
we scale each agent i’s valuation function so that the maximum marginal value of any item j is at
most 1. Specifically, for additive valuations, this implies vi(j) ≤ 1 for every agent i and item j.
An allocation is an ordered partition A = {A1, . . . , An} of the set of items into n bundles.
Agent i receives the (possibly empty) bundle Ai in the allocation A. The allocation A is envy-free
if
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak) ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ I.
That is, for any pair of agents i and k, agent i prefers its own bundle Ai over the bundle Ak. In
the (envy-free) fair division problem the objective is to find an envy-free allocation of the items.
Unfortunately, this objective is generally impossible to satisfy. A natural relaxation of the
objective arises by incorporating subsidies. Specifically, let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be a non-negative
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subsidy vector, where agent i receives a payment pi ≥ 0. An allocation with payments (A,p) is
then envy-free if
vi(Ai) + pi ≥ vi(Ak) + pk ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ I.
That is, each agent prefers its bundle plus payment over the bundle plus payment of every other
agent. In the fair division with subsidy problem the objective is to find an envy-free allocation with
payments whose total subsidy
∑
i∈I pi is minimized.
2.1 Envy-Freeability and the Envy Graph
For any fixed allocation A, a payment vector p such that {A,p} is envy-free does not always exist.
To see this, consider an instance with a single item and agents I = {1, 2} with values v1 < v2 for
the item. Now take the fixed allocation where the item is given to agent 1. It follows that agent 2
must receive a payment of at least v2 to eliminate its envy. But then, because v2 > v1, agent 1 is
envious of the bundle plus payment allocated to agent 2. Thus, no payment vector can eliminate
the envy of both agents for this allocation.
We call an allocation A envy-freeable if there exists a payment vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) such
that {A,p} is envy-free. There is a nice graphical characterization for the envy-freeability of an
allocation A. The envy graph, denoted GA, for an allocation A is a complete directed graph with
vertex set I. For any pair of agents i, k ∈ I the weight of arc (i, k) in GA is the envy agent i has
for agent k under the allocation A, that is, wA(i, k) = vi(Ak)− vi(Ai).
An allocation is envy-freeable if and only if its envy graph does not contain a positive-weight
directed cycle. More generally, Halpern and Shah [11] obtained the following theorem; we include
their proof in order to familiarize the reader with the structure of envy-freeable allocations.
Theorem 2.1. [11] The following statements are equivalent.
(a) The allocation A is envy-freeable.
(b) The allocation A maximizes (utilitarian) welfare across all reassignments of its bundles to
agents: for every permutation π of I = [n], we have
∑
i∈I vi(Ai) ≥
∑
i∈I vi(Api(i)).
(c) The envy graph GA contains no positive-weight directed cycles.
Proof.
(a) ⇒ (b): Let A = {A1, . . . , An} be envy-freeable. Then, by definition, there exists a payment
vector p such that vi(Ai) + pi ≥ vi(Ak) + pk, for any pair of agents i and k. Rearranging, we have
vi(Ak)− vi(Ai) ≤ pi − pk. Then, for any permutation π of I = [n]
∑
i∈I
(
vi(Api(i))− vi(Ai)
)
≤
∑
i∈I
(
pi − ppi(i)
)
=
∑
i∈I
pi −
∑
i∈I
ppi(i) = 0.
Thus the allocation A maximizes welfare over all reassignments of its bundles.
(b) ⇒ (c): Assume A maximizes welfare over all reassignments of its bundles and take a directed
cycle C in the envy graph GA. Without loss of generality C = {1, 2, . . . , r} for some r ≥ 2. Now
define a permutation πC of I according to the following rules: (i) πC(i) = i+ 1 for each i ≤ r − 1,
(ii) πC(r) = 1, and (iii) πC(i) = i otherwise. Then the weight of the cycle C in the envy graph
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satisfies
wA(C) =
∑
(i,k)∈C
wA(i, k)
=
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Ai+1)− vi(Ai)) + (vr(A1)− vr(Ar))
=
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Ai+1)− vi(Ai)) + (vr(A1)− vr(Ar)) +
n∑
i=r+1
(vi(Ai)− vi(Ai))
=
∑
i∈I
vi(Api(i))− vi(Ai)
≤ 0.
The inequality holds as A maximizes welfare over all bundle reassignments. Thus C has non-
positive weight.
(c) ⇒ (a): Assume the envy graph GA contains no positive-weight directed cycles. Let ℓGA(i) be
the maximum weight of any path (including the empty path) that starts at vertex i in GA. For each
agent i ∈ I, set its payment pi = ℓGA(i). Observe that pi ≥ 0 as the empty path has weight zero.
The corresponding pair (A,p) is then envy-free. To see this, recall that there are no positive-weight
cycles. Therefore, for any pair of agents i and k, we have
pi = ℓGA(i) ≥ wA(i, k) + ℓGA(k) = (vi(Ak)− vi(Ai)) + pk.
Thus vi(Ai) + pi ≥ vi(Ak) + pk and the allocation A is envy-freeable.
Theorem 2.1 is important for two reasons. First, whilst an allocation A = {A1, A2, . . . , An}
need not be envy-freeable, Condition (b) tells us that there is some permutation π of the bundles in
A such that the resultant allocation, Api = {Api(1), Api(2), . . . , Api(n)}, is envy-freeable! For example,
consider again the simple one-item, two-agent instance above. If the item is allocated to agent 1
then the weight on the arc (1, 2) is −v1 and the weight on the arc (2, 1) is v2. Because v1 < v2, the
envy graph has a positive-weight directed cycle {1, 2} and so, by Theorem 2.1, this allocation is
not envy-freeable. However, suppose we fix the bundles and find a utility-maximizing reallocation
of these fixed bundles. This reallocation assigns the item to agent 2 and now there is no positive-
weight directed cycle in the resultant envy-free graph; consequently this allocation is envy-freeable
by providing a subsidy in the range [v1, v2] to agent 1.
Second, to calculate the subsidy vector p associated with an envy-freeable allocation, such as
Api, it suffices to calculate the maximum-weight paths beginning at each vertex in its envy graph.
(In fact, it is straightforward to prove that the heaviest-path weights lower bound the payment to
each agent in any envy-free payment vector of an envy-freeable allocation [11].) Note that given
any payment vector that eliminates envy, we may uniformly increase or decrease the payments to
all agents while maintaining envy-freeness. As a consequence, in the payment vector that minimizes
the total subsidy, there is at least one agent that receives a payment of 0. Together these arguments
give the following very useful observation.
Observation 1. For any envy-freeable allocation A, the minimum total subsidy required is at
most (n− 1) · ℓmaxGA , where ℓ
max
GA
is the maximum weight of a directed path in the envy graph GA.
Halpern and Shah [11] then prove:
6
Theorem 2.2. [11] For any envy-freeable allocation A, the minimum total subsidy required is at
most (n− 1) ·m.
Proof. In a minimum subsidy vector, at least one agent requires no subsidy. Thus it suffices to
show that the subsidy to any agent i is at most m. By Observation 1, it suffices to show that
the heaviest path weight starting at any vertex is at most m. Without loss of generality, let the
heaviest path be P = {1, 2, . . . , r}. The subsidy made to agent 1 can then be upper bounded by
ℓGA(1) =
∑
(i,k)∈P
wA(i, k) =
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Ai+1)− vi(Ai)) ≤
r−1∑
i=1
vi(Ai+1) ≤
r−1∑
i=1
|Ai+1| ≤ |J | = m.
Here the second inequality holds because each agent has value at most one for any item. The
third inequality is due to the fact that for the allocation A the bundles {A1, A2, . . . , An} are disjoint.
Consequently pi ≤ m for each agent, as required.
For an arbitrary envy-freeable allocation A the bound in Theorem 2.2 is tight. To see this,
consider the example where every agent has value 1 for each item, and the grand bundle (containing
all items) is given to agent 1. This allocation is envy-freeable, and here each of the other n − 1
agents requires a subsidy of m for envy-freeness. Ergo, to provide an improved bound on the total
subsidy, we cannot consider any generic envy-freeable allocation. Instead, our task is find a specific
envy-freeable allocation where the heaviest paths in the associated envy graph have much smaller
weight. In particular, for the case of additive agents, we want that these path weights are at most
1 rather than at most m. This is our goal in the subsequent sections of the paper.
Before doing this, let us briefly discuss some computational aspects. Theorem 2.1 provides
efficient methods to test if a given allocation is envy-freeable. For example, this can be achieved via a
maximum-weight bipartite matching algorithm to verify Condition (b). Alternatively, Condition (c)
can be tested in polynomial time using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm.1 Finally, given an arbitrary
non-envy-freeable allocation A, one can efficiently find a corresponding envy-freeable allocation
Api by fixing the n bundles of the given allocation and computing a maximum-weight bipartite
matching between the agents and the bundles.
3 An Allocation Algorithm for Additive Agents
In this section we present an allocation algorithm for the case of additive agents. Recall our task is
to construct an envy-freeable allocation A with maximum path weight 1 in the envy graph GA. We
do this via an allocation algorithm defined on the valuation graph for the instance. The valuation
graph H is the complete bipartite graph on vertex sets I and J , where edge (i, j) has weight vi(j).
We denote by h[Iˆ , Jˆ ] the subgraph of H induced by Iˆ ⊆ I and Jˆ ⊆ J . The allocation algorithm
then proceeds in rounds where each agent is matched to exactly one item in each round. For the
first round, we set J1 = J . In round t, we then find a maximum-weight matching Mt in H[I, Jt]. If
agent i is matched to item j = µti then we allocate item µ
t
i to that agent. We then recurse on the
remaining items Jt+1 = Jt \ ∪i∈Iµ
t
i. The process ends when every item has been allocated. This
procedure is formalized via pseudocode in Algorithm 1.
Suppose the algorithm terminates in T rounds. We assume that every agent receives an item in
each round. For rounds 1 to T − 1 this is evident because agent i can be assigned a item for which
1In fact, a simple reduction converts the problem of finding minimum payments for a fixed allocation into a shortest-
paths problem and any efficient shortest-paths algorithm can be applied.
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Algorithm 1: Bounded-Subsidy Algorithm
Ai ← ∅ for all i ∈ I;
t← 1;J1 ← J ;
while Jt 6= ∅ do
Compute a maximum-weight matching M t = {(i, µti)}i∈I in H[I, Jt];
Set Ai ← Ai ∪ {µ
t
i} for all i ∈ I;
Set Jt+1 ← Jt \ ∪i∈Iµ
t
i;
t← t+ 1;
end
it has zero value. For round T , we assume there are exactly n items remaining, possibly by adding
dummy items of no value to any agent.
This algorithm has many interesting properties. In this section we prove that it outputs an
envy-freeable allocation A. Furthermore, the allocation A is EF1, thus settling Conjecture 1.2.
The allocation is also balanced in that (discarding any additional dummy items) the bundles that
the agents receive differ in size by at most one item; in particular, each agent receives a bundle of
size either ⌊m
n
⌋ or ⌈m
n
⌉. The allocation algorithm also clearly runs in polynomial time.
We also show in this section that any allocation A that is both envy-freeable and EF1 has a
heaviest path weight in the envy graph of weight at most n − 1. Thus, By Observation 1, the
algorithm outputs an allocation that requires a subsidy of at most (n − 1)2. As claimed though,
the heaviest path weight in GA is in fact at most one and so the total subsidy needed is at most
n− 1. We defer the proof of this fact, our main result, to Section 4.
3.1 The Allocation Is Envy-freeable
Let’s first see that the output allocation A is envy-freeable.
Lemma 3.1. The output allocation A is envy-freeable.
Proof. Let M t be the maximum matching found in round t and µt = {µt1, µ
t
2, . . . , µ
t
n} the corre-
sponding items allocated in that round. By Theorem 2.1 it suffices to show that no directed cycle in
the envy graph corresponding to the final allocation A has positive weight. Take any directed cycle
C in the envy graph GA. Again, we may assume without loss of generality that C = {1, 2, . . . , r}
for some r ≥ 2. We have
wA(C) =
∑
(i,k)∈C
wA(i, k)
=
∑
(i,k)∈C
[vi(Ak)− vi(Ai)]
=
∑
(i,k)∈C
T∑
t=1
[
vi(µ
t
k)− vi(µ
t
i)
]
=
∑
(i,k)∈C
T∑
t=1
wµt(i, k)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
(i,k)∈C
wµt(i, k).
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Let πC be the permutation of I under which πC(i) = i + 1 for each i ≤ r − 1, πC(r) = 1, and
πC(i) = i otherwise. In each round t, since Mt is a maximum-weight matching,
∑
(i,k)∈C wµt(i, k)
is non-positive: otherwise, the matching Mˆ t obtained by allocating to each agent i the item µt
piC(i)
has greater weight than Mt, a contradiction. Thus wA(C) is also non-positive. Consequently, by
Theorem 2.1 the allocation produced by the algorithm is envy-freeable.
3.2 The Allocation Is EF1
We say that an allocation A satisfies the envy bounded by a single good property, and is EF1, if for
each pair i, k of agents, either Ak = ∅ or there exists an item j ∈ Ak such that
vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Ak \ {j}).
Next, let’s prove the output allocation A is EF1.
Lemma 3.2. The output allocation A is EF1.
Proof. Let A = {A1, . . . , An}. Recall, in any round t, the algorithm computes a maximum-weight
matching M t in H[I, Jt] and allocates item µ
t
i to agent i. Thus Ai = {µ
1
i , . . . , µ
T
i } is the set of
items allocated to agent i. Observe that vi(µ
t
i) ≥ vi(j) for any item j ∈ Jt+1, the collection of items
unallocated at the start of round t+1. Otherwise, we can replace the edge (i, µti) with (i, j) in Mt,
to obtain a higher-weight matching in H[I, Jt]. Therefore, for any pair of agents i and k, we have
vi(Ai) = vi({µ
1
i , . . . , µ
T
i })
= vi(µ
1
i ) + · · · + vi(µ
T−1
i ) + vi(µ
T
i )
≥ vi(µ
1
i ) + · · · + vi(µ
T−1
i )
≥ vi(µ
2
k) + · · ·+ vi(µ
T
k )
= vi(Ak \ {µ
1
k}).
Ergo, the output allocation A is EF1.
Claim 3.3. Let A be both envy-freeable and EF1. Then the minimum total subsidy required is at
most (n− 1)2.
Proof. Since there is an agent that requires no subsidy, it suffices to prove that the maximum path
weight in the envy graph GA is at most n− 1. But A is EF1. So agent i envies agent k by at most
one, the maximum value of a single item. Thus every arc (i, k) has weight at most one, that is,
wA(i, k) ≤ 1. The result follows as any path contains at most n− 1 arcs.
Since we have shown that the output allocation A is both envy-freeable and EF1, it immediately
follows by Claim 3.3 that it requires a total subsidy of at most (n− 1)2.
4 The Subsidy Required Is at Most One per Agent
In this section we complete our analysis of the additive setting. By the EF1 property of the output
allocation GA we have an upper bound of 1 on the weight of any arc in the envy graph GA. But this
is insufficient to accomplish our goal of proving that the envy graph has maximum path weight 1.
How can we do this? As a thought experiment, imagine that, rather than an upper bound of 1 on
each arc weight, we have a lower bound of −1 on each arc weight. The subsequent lemma proves
this would be a sufficient condition!
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Lemma 4.1. Let A be an envy-freeable allocation. If wA(i, k) ≥ −1 for every arc (i, k) in the envy
graph then the maximum subsidy required is at most one per agent.
Proof. By Theorem 2.1, as A is an envy-freeable the envy graph GA contains no positive-weight
cycles. Let P be the maximum-weight path in GA. Without loss of generality, P = {1, 2, . . . , i}
with weight p1 = ℓGA(1). Now take the directed cycle C = P ∪ (i, 1). Because C has non-positive
weight and every arc weight is at least −1, we obtain
0 ≥ wA(C) = ℓGA(1) +wA(i, 1) ≥ ℓGA(1) − 1.
Therefore ℓGA(1) ≤ 1 and the maximum subsidy is at most one.
At first glance, Lemma 4.1 seems of little use. We already know every arc in the envy graph
has weight at most 1. Suppose in addition that every arc weight was at least −1. That is,
1 ≥ wA(i, k) ≥ −1 for each arc (i, k). Consequently, vi(Ai) ≤ vi(Ak)+1 and vi(Ak) ≤ vi(Ai)+1. In
instances with a large number of valuable items this means that every agent is essentially indifferent
over which bundle in A they receive. It is unlikely that an allocation with this property even exists
for every instance, and certainly not the case that our algorithm outputs such an allocation.
The trick is to apply Lemma 4.1 to a modified fair division instance. In particular we construct,
for each agent i, a modified valuation function v¯i from vi. We then prove that the allocation A
v
output for the original valuation profile v is envy-freeable even for the modified valuation profile v¯.
Next we show that with this same allocation, every arc weight is at least −1 in the envy graph under
the modified valuation profile v¯. By Lemma 4.1, this implies that the maximum subsidy required is
at most one for the valuation profile v¯. To complete the proof we show that the maximum subsidy
required by each agent for the original valuation profile v is at most the subsidy required for v¯.
4.1 A Modified Valuation Function
Let Av = {Av1 , . . . , A
v
n} be the allocation output by our algorithm under the original valuation
profile v. We now create the modified valuation profile v¯. For each agent i, define v¯i according to
the rule:
v¯i(µ
t
i) = vi(µ
t
i) ∀t ≤ T
v¯i(µ
t
k) = max
(
vi(µ
t
k), vi(µ
t+1
i )
)
∀k ∈ I \ {i}, ∀t ≤ T − 1
v¯i(µ
T
k ) = vi(µ
T
k ) ∀k ∈ I \ {i}.
That is, the value v¯i(j) remains the same for any item j ∈ A
v
i that was allocated to agent i by the
algorithm. For any other item j, the value v¯i(j) is the maximum of the original value vi(j) and the
value of the item allocated to i by the algorithm in the round that immediately follows the round
where j was allocated to some agent.
The following two observations are trivial but will be useful.
Observation 2. For any agent i and item j ∈ Avi , we have vi(j) = v¯i(j).
Observation 3. For any agent i and item j /∈ Avi , we have vi(j) ≤ v¯i(j).
We will show the bound on the subsidy by a sequence of claims based on the proof plan outlined
above. First we show that Av envy-freeable even under the modified valuation profile.
Claim 4.2. The allocation Av output under the original valuation profile v is an envy-freeable
allocation under the modified valuation profile v¯.
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Proof. By Theorem 2.1, to show that the allocation Av is envy-freeable under the modified valuation
profile v¯ we must show that there is no positive-weight cycle in the envy graph using the modified
values. So suppose cycle C has positive modified weight. To obtain a contradiction, first observe
that, in the allocation Av, agent i receives the bundle Avi = {µ
1
i , µ
2
i , . . . , µ
T
i }. Thus with respect
to v¯ the envy agent i has for agent k is
v¯i(A
v
k)− v¯i(A
v
i ) =
T∑
t=1
v¯i(µ
t
k)−
T∑
t=1
v¯i(µ
t
i) =
T∑
t=1
(
v¯i(µ
t
k)− v¯i(µ
t
i)
)
. (1)
As the envy graph contains a positive-weight cycle C we have, by (1), that
0 <
∑
(i,k)∈C
v¯i(A
v
k)− v¯i(A
v
i ) =
∑
(i,k)∈C
T∑
t=1
(
v¯i(µ
t
k)− v¯i(µ
t
i)
)
=
T∑
t=1
∑
(i,k)∈C
(
v¯i(µ
t
k)− v¯i(µ
t
i)
)
.
This implies there exists a round t such that
∑
(i,k)∈C
v¯i(µ
t
k) >
∑
(i,k)∈C
v¯i(µ
t
i). (2)
Now M t is a maximum-weight matching in H[I, Jt] for the original valuation profile v. Let Mˆ
t be
the matching formed from M t by permuting around the cycle C the bundles of the agents in C.
But then, by (2), the matching Mˆ t has greater weight in H[I, Jt] than the matching M
t for the
modified profile v¯. Consequently, we will obtain our contradiction if we can prove that M t is a
maximum-weight matching in H[I, Jt] even with respect to v¯.
This is true in the final round matching; clearly MT is a maximum-weight matching in H[I, JT ]
because, by definition, v¯ and v have the same value for items in JT . Thus, it remains to prove
the statement for each round t ≤ T − 1. Now µt = {µt1, µ
t
2, . . . , µ
t
n} is the allocation of the items
round t. Again, for a contradiction, assume that matching M t is not maximum in H[I, Jt] for the
valuation profile v¯. Then, by Theorem 2.1, the envy graph Gµt contains a positive-weight directed
cycle C. Without loss of generality, let C = {1, . . . , r}.
We divide our analysis into two cases, depending on whether the weights on the arcs of C
change when the valuation profile is modified from v to v¯. Specifically, we call an arc (i, i + 1) of
C blue if v¯i(µ
t
i+1) = vi(µ
t
i+1), that is, agent i’s value for the item allocated to agent i+ 1 does not
change when the valuation profile is modified. We call an arc red otherwise. Observe that if the
arc (i, i + 1) of C is red, then v¯i(µ
t
i+1) = vi(µ
t+1
i ) > vi(µ
t
i+1), so in the original valuation function
agent i strictly prefers the item that it is allocated in round t + 1 to the item that agent i + 1 is
allocated in round t. In turn, this implies that the weight on any red arc is necessarily negative.
We have the following two cases to consider.
(i) Every arc of C is blue. Let πC be the permutation of I under which πC(i) = i + 1 for each
i ≤ r − 1, πC(r) = 1, and πC(i) = i otherwise. The matching M
t obtained by allocating to
each agent i the item µt
piC(i)
has greater weight than M t with respect to the original valuation
profile v, contradicting the assumption that the algorithm selected a matching of maximum
weight.
(ii) C contains a red arc. In this case, C can be decomposed into a sequence of d directed paths
P1, . . . , Pd such that each directed path consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of blue arcs
followed by exactly one red arc. Figure 1 shows an example of such a decomposition. In the
figure, blue arcs are represented by solid lines and red arcs by dashed lines.
11
0.2
−0.3
−0.1
0.6−0.2
0.4
−0.4
−0.1
0.2
−0.3
−0.1
0.6−0.2
0.4
−0.4
−0.1
C
P1
P2
P3
P4
Figure 1: An example showing the decomposition of C into directed paths P1, . . . , P4. In this
example, P2 has positive weight.
Now, since C has positive total weight, there is a directed path P ∈ {P1, . . . , Pd} of positive
total weight. Without loss of generality, let P = {1, 2, . . . , k + 1}. Thus in the envy graph
Gµt we have
wµt(P ) =
k∑
i=1
wµt(i, i + 1) > 0. (3)
Construct a matching Mt = {(i, ωti)}i∈I in the following manner. For each agent i ≥ k + 1,
set ωti = µ
t
i; that is, the end-vertex of the path P and all agents not on P are matched to
the same item in Mt as in M t. For each agent i ≤ k − 1, let ωti = µ
t
i+1, that is in the
allocation Mt agent i receives the item that agent i+ 1 receives in M t. Finally, for agent k
let ωtk = M
t+1
k ; that is, in M
t agent k receives the item it would have received in the next
round in M t+1.
Observe that every item allocated by Mt was available for allocation in round t and, thus,
it was a feasible allocation to select in round t. Next let’s compare the relative values of Mt
and M t under the original valuations v. To do this, observe that by definition of Mt we have
v(Mt)− v(M t) =
k∑
i=1
(
vi(ω
t
i)− vi(µ
t
i)
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
(
vi(ω
t
i)− vi(µ
t
i)
)
+
(
vk(ω
t
k)− vk(µ
t
k)
)
=
k−1∑
i=1
(
vi(µ
t
i+1)− vi(µ
t
i)
)
+
(
vk(µ
t+1
k )− vk(µ
t
k)
)
. (4)
But (k, k + 1) is a red arc in Gµt . Therefore, it must be the case that vk(µ
t+1
k ) > vk(µ
t
k+1).
Plugging this into (4) gives
v(Mt)− v(M t) >
k−1∑
i=1
(
vi(µ
t
i+1)− vi(µ
t
i)
)
+
(
vk(µ
t
k+1)− vk(µ
t
k)
)
=
k∑
i=1
(
vi(µ
t
i+1)− vi(µ
t
i)
)
. (5)
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But, by definition, wµt(i, i+ 1) = vi(µ
t
i+1)− vi(µ
t
i). So, together (3) and (5) imply
v(Mt)− v(M t) >
k∑
i=1
wµt(i, i+ 1) > 0. (6)
Thus Mt has greater weight than M t under the original valuations v. This contradicts the
optimality of M t.
Claim 4.2 shows that the allocation Av produced by the algorithm on the original instance is
an envy-freeable allocation in the modified instance. We next show that for this modified valuation
profile the subsidy required is at most 1 for each agent. In particular the total subsidy is at most
n− 1.
Claim 4.3. For the envy-freeable allocation Av the subsidy to each agent is at most 1 for the
modified valuation profile v¯.
Proof. Take the valuation profile v¯ and the allocation Av = {Av1 , . . . , A
v
n}. We claim that for any
arc (i, k) its modified weight w¯Av (i, k) in the the envy graph is at least −1. To prove this take any
pair of agents i and k. Then
w¯Av (i, k) = v¯i(A
v
k)− v¯i(A
v
i )
=
T∑
t=1
v¯i(µ
t
k)−
T∑
t=1
v¯i(µ
t
i)
=
T∑
t=1
v¯i(µ
t
k)−
T∑
t=1
vi(µ
t
i)
=
T−1∑
t=1
max(vi(µ
t
k), vi(µ
t+1
i )) + vi(µ
T
i )−
T∑
t=1
vi(µ
t
i)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
vi(µ
t+1
i )−
T−1∑
t=1
vi(µ
t
i). (7)
We can simplify (7) and lower bound it via a telescoping sum:
w¯Av (i, k) ≥
T−1∑
t=1
(
vi(µ
t+1
i )− vi(µ
t
i)
)
= vi(µ
T
i )− vi(µ
1
i )
≥ −vi(µ
1
i )
≥ −1. (8)
Now by Claim 4.2, the allocation Av is envy-freeable with respect to the valuations v¯. Applying
Lemma 4.1, because the arc weights are lower bounded by −1 the subsidy required per agent is
then at most one for the modified valuation profile v¯.
Finally, since there is an agent whose payment is 0, the total subsidy required is upper bounded
by n− 1.
The following claim shows that, for any agent, the subsidy for the original valuation profile is
at most the subsidy required for the modified valuation function.
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Claim 4.4. For the allocation Av the subsidy required by an agent given valuation profile v is at
most the subsidy required given valuation profile v¯.
Proof. By Observation 2, vi(j) = v¯i(j) for any j ∈ A
v
i . Therefore, by additivity,
v¯i(A
v
i ) =
∑
j∈Av
i
v¯i(j) =
∑
j∈Av
i
vi(j) = vi(A
v
i ). (9)
On the other hand, Observation 3 states that vi(j) ≤ v¯i(j) for any j /∈ A
v
i . Thus, for any pair i
and k of agents, we have
v¯i(A
v
k ) =
∑
j∈Av
k
v¯i(j) ≥
∑
j∈Av
k
vi(j) = vi(A
v
k). (10)
Combining (9) and (10) gives
w¯Av (i, k) = v¯i(A
v
k)− v¯i(A
v
i ) ≥ vi(A
v
k)− vi(A
v
i ) = wAv (i, k).
Consequently, the weight of any arc (i, k) in the envy graph with the modified valuation profile is
at least its weight with the original valuation profile. Therefore the weight of any path in the envy
graph is higher with the modified valuation profile than with the original valuation profile. The
claim follows.
Together Claims 4.3 and 4.4 give our main result.
Theorem 1.3. For additive valuations there is an envy-freeable allocation where the subsidy to
each agent is at most one dollar. (This allocation is also EF1, balanced, and can be computed in
polynomial time.)
5 Bounding the Subsidy for Monotone Valuations
We now consider the much more general setting where the valuations of the agents are arbitrary
monotone functions. That is, the only assumptions we impose are that vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) when S ⊆ T
and the basic assumption that vi(∅) = 0. Without loss of generality, we may scale the valuations
so that the marginal value of each item for any agent never exceeds one dollar. Our goal in this
section is to show that there is an envy-freeable allocation in which the total subsidy required for
envy-freeness is at most 2(n−1)2. In particular, the total subsidy required is independent of of the
number of items m. When m > 2(n− 1) this bound beats the bound (n− 1) ·m of [11] for additive
valuations described in Theorem 2.2 and, more importantly, it applies to the far more general class
of arbitrary monotone valuations.
Our method to compute the desired envy-freeable allocation begins with finding an EF1 al-
location. The well-known envy-cycles algorithm of Lipton et al. [14] finds such an allocation in
polynomial time given oracle access to the valuations, under the same mild conditions on the val-
uations. For completeness, we briefly describe the envy-cycles algorithm. The algorithm proceeds
in a sequence of m rounds, allocating one item in each round. At any point during the algorithm,
we denote by G the envy graph corresponding to the current allocation, and by H the subgraph of
G that consists of all the agents and only the arcs that have positive weight, that is, positive envy.
We call H the auxiliary graph of G. The algorithm relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. [14] For any partial allocation A with auxiliary graph H, there is another partial
allocation A′ with auxiliary graph H ′ such that
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• H ′ is acyclic.
• For each agent i, the maximum weight of an outgoing arc from i is less in A′ than in A.
The basic idea of the algorithm then is to maintain the following two invariants: (i) at each
step, the partial allocation is EF1, and (ii) at the start and end of each round, the auxiliary graph
H is acyclic. Since the auxiliary graph is a directed acyclic graph at the start of each round, it
has a source vertex. The algorithm simply chooses this vertex and allocates the next item to the
corresponding agent. Because no other agent envies this agent before this item is allocated, the
envies of the other agents are bounded by the value of this item (so the allocation of this item
maintains the EF1 invariant). Next, the algorithm identifies a directed cycle (if one exists) in the
auxiliary graph H and redistributes bundles by rotating them around this cycle. It is easy to see
that the EF1 guarantee is maintained after this redistribution of the bundles, and that the number
of arcs in H strictly decreases. All cycles in H are then eliminated in sequence until H is acyclic
and the round ends. When all items have been allocated, the final allocation is EF1.
This immediately raises the question of whether the resulting allocation is envy-freeable. By
Claim 3.3, we know that if an allocation is both envy-freeable and EF1, then the total subsidy
required for envy-freeness is (n− 1)2, since the weight of any path is at most n− 1. Unfortunately,
it is possible that the allocation output by the envy-cycles algorithm is not envy-freeable. However,
we show that an EF1 allocation can still be used to produce an envy-freeable allocation that requires
only a small increase in the subsidy! Specifically, the following key lemma shows that if we begin
by fixing the bundles of an EF1 allocation and then redistribute these bundles to produce an envy-
freeable allocation, the weight of any path increases to at most 2(n − 1). By Theorem 2.1, an
envy-freeable allocation can be found by computing a maximum-weight matching.
Lemma 5.2. Let A be an EF1 allocation, and B be the envy-freeable allocation corresponding to a
maximum-weight matching between the agents and the bundles of A. Then B can be made envy-free
with a subsidy of at most 2(n − 1) to each agent.
Proof. Let A = {A1, . . . , An} be an EF1 allocation. So, for any pair i and k of agents, vi(Ak) −
vi(Ai) ≤ 1. Let π be a permutation of the bundles that maximizes
∑
i vi(Api(i)). Then, by Theo-
rem 2.1, the allocation B = {B1, . . . , Bn} = {Api(1), . . . , Api(n)} is envy-freeable. Next, let P be a
directed path in the envy graph GB. Without loss of generality, P = {1, 2, . . . , r} for some r ≥ 2.
Our goal is to show that the weight of P in GB is at most 2(n − 1). Clearly, the weight of P in
GA is at most n − 1. Consider an arc (i, i + 1) of P . Since A is EF1, for any agent k, we have
vi(Ak) − vi(Ai) ≤ 1. Now, agent i + 1 receives the bundle of agent π(i + 1) in the redistributed
allocation B. We have vi(Api(i+1))− vi(Ai) ≤ 1 and, thus, vi(Bi+1)− vi(Ai) ≤ 1. It follows that:
wB(P ) =
∑
(i,k)∈P
wB(i, k)
=
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Bi+1)− vi(Bi))
=
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Bi+1)− vi(Ai) + vi(Ai)− vi(Bi))
≤
r−1∑
i=1
(1 + vi(Ai)− vi(Bi))
≤ (n− 1) +
r−1∑
i=1
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi)) (11)
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To complete the proof, it remains to show that
∑r−1
i=1 (vi(Ai)− vi(Bi)) is at most n− 1. Together
with (11), this implies that wB(P ) ≤ 2(n − 1).
Since π maximizes
∑
i vi(Api(i)), we have
∑
i vi(Bi) ≥
∑
i vi(Ai). The key observation is that,
while the sum of values of the bundles received by all agents increases when we redistribute the
bundles from A to B, the value of the bundle received by any single agent increases by at most one
because A is EF1. This then constrains the amount by which the total value for any subset of agents
can decrease. Specifically, let R ⊆ I be the set of agents i that receive a bundle Bi of smaller value
than Ai, that is, R = {i ∈ I : vi(Bi) < vi(Ai)}. Let S = I \R, so S = {i ∈ I : vi(Bi) ≥ vi(Ai)}.
Now, we have two cases to consider.
(i) |R| = 0.
Then
∑r−1
i=1 (vi(Ai)− vi(Bi)) ≤ 0 and the result follows.
(ii) |R| ≥ 1.
Then |S| ≤ n− 1, and we have
∑
i∈[r−1]
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi)) =
∑
i∈[r−1]∩R
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi)) +
∑
i∈[r−1]∩S
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi))
≤
∑
i∈[r−1]∩R
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi))
≤
∑
i∈R
(vi(Ai)− vi(Bi))
≤
∑
i∈S
(vi(Bi)− vi(Ai))
≤ n− 1.
The second to last inequality says that the total decrease in value for agents in R is at
most the total increase in value for agents in S (since B is an optimal redistribution of the
bundles). The final inequality follows from the fact that |S| ≤ n − 1 and for each i ∈ S,
vi(Bi)− vi(Ai) ≤ 1 since A is EF1.
Together, Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 bound the total subsidy sufficient for envy-freeness when the
valuation functions are monotone.
Theorem 1.4. For monotonic valuations there is an envy-freeable allocation where the subsidy to
each agent is at most 2(n − 1) dollars. (Given a valuation oracle, this allocation can be computed
in polynomial time.)
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